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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,' the public trust doctrine is poised to become a
renewed presence in the courts.' Though this common law doctrine
traditionally effectuated public access to tidal waters for fishing, boating,
or commerce, the doctrine's recent American history has been marked by
expansion. The doctrine now encompasses all navigable waters, and the
triad of interests historically served by the doctrine has been judicially
expanded to include more general recreational and ecological interests.
3
* Attorney, Zumbrun, Best & Findley, a public issue litigation firm in Sacramento. California;
M.S.L. 1992, Vermont Law School; J.D. 1992, Vermont Law School; B.A., 1988, Middlebury College.
This paper was initiated pursuant to a Carthage Fellowship at the Political Economy Research Center.
Bozeman, Montana.
1. 112 S. CL 2886 (1992).
2. The resurrection of the public trust doctrine began shortly after the Lucas decision, when the
Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that the public possessed the right to use the dry sand area of the coastal
zone and held that this right was superior to any private owner's property interest. The court implied
that because the public trust precluded any transfer to private title, "the purportedly taken interest was
not part of plaintiff's estate to begin with." Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940.942 (Or. Ct.
App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994). Therefore, there was no taking under the Oregon or
United States Constitutions. Id.
3. Such judicial expansion of the public trust was first espoused in an article published in 1970 as
a means to judicially develop comprehensive resource management. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1970). For
a discussion of the case law which has advanced this expansion, see infra pp. 14-16.
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Concurrent with this expansion in the courts, extensive environmental
regulatory schemes have been passed by the legislature.4 Reacting to these
schemes, courts have imposed obligations on private landowners in the
interest of furthering perceived environmental benefits. 5 Environmental
activism and the paths of the public trust doctrine are now in conflict with
the Fifth Amendment's provision of just compensation. Mr. Lucas, a
property owner, asked the Supreme Court to interpret the relationship
between an environmental regulation and the Fifth Amendment, but the
outcome appears to have drawn the public trust doctrine more tightly into
the morass of conflict.
In Lucas, the United States Supreme Court examined the impact of
an environmental regulation, the South Carolina Beachfront Management
Act (Act), 6 upon private property rights.7 The Act, which was upheld by
South Carolina's highest court, 8 directed the Coastal Council to establish a
baseline along the shore, seaward of which habitable improvements would
be prohibited.' This baseline effectively barred the development of any
habitable structures on two residentially zoned lots which Mr. Lucas had
acquired two years previously for $975,000.
The United States Supreme Court held that any regulation so severe
as to prohibit all economically beneficial use of land is a categorical taking
warranting just compensation, regardless of the public benefit, unless the
limitation inflicted upon the property inheres in the title itself."0 "Where
4. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370d, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
January 1, 1970, 83 Stat. 852, as amended; Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675, Pub. L. No. 96-510, December I1, 1980,94
Stat. 2767, as amended; Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1251-
1387, Pub. L. No. 92-500, October 18, 1972, 86 Stat. 896, as amended; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401-76719, Pub. L. No. 88-206, December 17, 1963, 77 Stat. 401, as amended.
5. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in part: "INor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The practice of
avoiding such obligation is not entirely recent. See, e.g., Patton v. City of Wilmington, 147 P. 141, 146
(Cal. 1915) (Henshaw, J., concurring). Justice Henshaw reasoned that the fictional jus publicum/jus
privatum distinction was "declared, or rather, I should say, was created by this court." Id. The Justice
further stated that:
[T] he people of California were for the first time advised that this state, in offering for sale
the fee of certain of its tide lands, without the slightest reservation of any rights ... and in
making grants and patents ... and in taking its citizens' money ... was practicing the art of
Jeremy Diddler by hoodwinking its citizens into the belief that they were acquiring a fee
simple to lands, whereas in fact they were but acquiring a nondescript jus privatum which
entitled them to use the lands until the state should retake them.
Id.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1993).
7. 112 S. Ct. 2886.
8. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280 (directing council to establish baselines); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 48-39-290 (prohibiting new construction or reconstruction seaward of the baseline).
10. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
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the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use ... it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with.""1 The Court ruled that the
Coastal Council had not justified the total regulatory taking of Mr. Lucas's
land.12
The Court remanded the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court to
allow the Coastal Council to identify background principles of nuisance
and property law that would restrain Mr. Lucas from constructing a
habitable structure on his land.13 The South Carolina Supreme Court
established that no such principles applied to Mr. Lucas's facts and
remanded the matter to the lower court for a determination of proper
compensation.14 After Lucas, courts must look to the inherent restrictions
of state nuisance and property law that define the traditional limits of
property rights before awarding just compensation. Because courts have
already recognized the public trust doctrine as a traditional property
limitation,15 a resurgence of the public trust doctrine seems certain as
states seek theories to avoid paying otherwise appropriate compensation.16
Courts will find fertile precedent establishing the public trust as a
11. Id. at 2899.
12. Id. at 2900.
13. Id. at 2901-02.
14. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484. 486 (S.C. 1992). Subsequently,
Mr. Lucas settled his claim against the state of South Carolina for S425.000 per lot and S725.000 for
attorneys' fees, costs, and interim interest. Joint Statement, signed by Bachman S. Smith. ill. of
Sinkler & Boyd, P.A., Attorneys for the South Carolina Coastal Council and the State of South
Carolina, and Gerald M. Finkel, of Finkel, Goldberg, Shcftman & Altman, Attorneys for David H.
Lucas (undated) (on file with author).
Cotton Harness III, general counsel for the Coastal Council, has since indicated that the state
would resell the property to another developer to recover some of its costs of settlement. Harness said
that the new buyers will be permitted to develop the sites subject to normal beachfront restrictions,
saying that, "People are quite willing to buy beachfront property." David Lucas in turn called the
state's decision to permit development "the height of hypocrisy." Kenneth Jost.South Carolina Settles
Lucas Case, CAL. PLANNING & DEv. REPORT, Aug. 1993. at 5.
15. Public trust issues are governed solely by state law and do not raise federal jurisdiction
questions. See, e.g., New York v. Delyser, 759 F. Supp. 982,990 (W.D.N.Y. 199 1) ("the States rights
and duties with respect to these lands are governed purely by state law, and the claims based on the
public trust doctrine therefore do not "arise under" federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a)"); Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1327 (7th Cir. 1983). cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207
(1983) (whether the state owned navigable waters in trust for the public was "entirely a matter of
Wisconsin law, subject only to the exercise by the United States of one of its constitutional powers-);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that title to submerged lands under navigable
waters is governed by state law subject only to the federal interests in interstate and foreign commerce).
But see Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL L. 425, 425-26 (1989) ("The public trust
doctrine is complicated-there are 51 public trust doctrines in this country alone ..... * Wilkinson posits
that there is a doctrine adopted by each state and a 51st federal doctrine.).
16. For the earliest post-Lucas construction of a property limitation. see Stevens. 835 P.2d 940.
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traditional limitation upon the use and even the ownership of property. 7
However, widespread acceptance of the public trust doctrine has not
always led to desired environmental goods.' Though well-intended, such
ill-defined goods allow the free-riding public to suffer while natural
resources continue to be degraded. This article encourages courts to
reexamine the public trust doctrine in light of unprecedented consumptive
pressures on our natural resources and the consequent importance of
efficient resource management. The current environmental course of
legislative, regulatory, and judicial activism is perhaps not as wise as once
believed. Therefore, this article advocates a changed course in the
environmental arena.
To determine the totality of both intended and unintended impacts,
this article measures change not by good intentions but by the overall
effects of implementation.19 Justice Stewart similarly rejected measuring
only well-meaning intentions:
As is so often the case when a State exercises its power to make
law, or to regulate, or to pursue a public project, pre-existing
property rights were impaired here without any calculated
decision to deprive anyone of what he once owned. But the
Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State
says, or by what it intends, but by what it does.2"
Judicial acceptance of ill-defined though well-intended environmental
goods has not been successful. Therefore, courts should pursue a new path
which renews the constitutional premise of this nation's liberty and
property rights.
This article begins by tracing the history of property rights and the
evolution of the public trust doctrine. Next, the article emphasizes the most
recent judicial expansions of the public trust doctrine and discusses
resource costs derived from the expansion of the doctrine. The article
concludes with a seemingly paradoxical recommendation: the privatiza-
17. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (one of the earliest cases establishing
the public trust as a limitation on private property). In California, however, properties subjected to the
public trust may still warrant compensation. California v. Superior Court of Placer County (Fogerty),
625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981) (subjecting property along the shores of
Lake Tahoe to the public trust). These property owners again appealed to the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari, claiming they deserved compensation. Fogerty v. California, 484 U.S. 821 (1986).
The Attorney General for Respondent, State of California, opposed certiorari, claiming that whether
the establishment of the public trust on longstanding property rights amounted to an unconstitutional
taking was not ripe for review. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 26, Fogerty v. State,
231 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986) (No. 86-1877), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
18. See infra notes 124, 128 and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.
19. John F. Chant et al., The Economics of the Conserver Society, in ECONoMics AND Tim
ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 1, 83 (W. Block ed., 1990).
20. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
[Vol. 15
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tion of the public trust doctrine can ensure that our water resources will be
managed efficiently and in the public's best interest while still meeting the
public demand for continued access.
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC RIGHTS
The rift between private property rights and public trust theory is not
a new one.21 The Magna Carta, written in 1215 A.D. and recognized as the
earliest English charter of individual liberties, "declares that no freeman
shall be deprived of his freehold or other fundamental rights except by
judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.1122 This deference
continued in England during the formative years of our common law and
was brought to America with the colonists. As one commentator has noted,
"while the British were scoundrels in a thousand ways, they never abused
eminent domain. 23
John Locke believed that natural rights derived from a principled,
natural equality among men.2' Locke believed that governments were
formed to protect and preserve "lives, liberties and fortunes, 2 5 or in other
words, life, liberty, and property. Federalists, such as James Madison, not
only embraced Locke's principles but also believed property rights to be
"inviolable. ' 26 According to Madison, government was instituted "no less
for the protection of property than of the persons. 27 Madison "attributed
the convening of the Constitutional Convention less to the necessity of
remedying the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation than to
providing some effective security for private economic rights."2 8 At the
convention, Madison not only proposed the takings clause as an amend-
21. See, e.g., Michael Futterman & Clarence B. Nixon 111, The Public Trust After Lyon and
Fogerty: Private Interests and Public Expectations-A New Balance, 16 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 631
(1983).
22. Bernard H. Siegan, The Law and Land, in PRIVATE RIoHTS & PuBuc LANDS 9 (Phillip N.
Truluck ed., 1983).
23. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain. 47 WASH. L. REV. 553. 566
(1972).
24. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 122 (Thomas Cook ed.. 1947).
25. Id. at 191. For a more recent but similar analysis, see Lynch v. Household Finance Co.. 405
U.S. 538, 552 (1972), "[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists
between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning
without the other."
But see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 911 F.2d
1331, 1338 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Suffice it to say that even the framers of the fifth amendment saw the
wisdom of enumerating life, liberty and property separately, and that few of us would put equal value
on the first and third.").
26. PROPERTY, NATIONAL GAZETTE, March 27, 1792, reprinted In 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 266, 267 (Robert Rutland & Thomas Mason eds., 1983).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 231 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed, 1961).
28. Siegan, supra note 22, at 11.
19941
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ment to the Constitution, but also sought a federal legislative body to
represent only property owners.2" Adam Smith embraced the Madisonian
property ethic:
It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner
of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of
many years, or perhaps by many successive generations, can
sleep a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded by
unknown enemies, whom, though he never provokes, he can never
appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the
powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to
chastise it. The acquisition of valuable and extensive property,
therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil
government. 30
Thomas Jefferson disagreed with these principles and perceived property
as a benefit of privilege. He believed that government served not to protect
life, liberty, and property, but instead, "life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. '"' Under the Jeffersonian view, individuals retained or owned
property in trust for the benefit of the whole of society.32
The Jeffersonian perspective justifies a highly centralized regulatory
means of environmental management. Proponents of centralized controls
believe that such control eliminates externalities and by dispersion, lowers
transaction costs, thereby preserving communal resources. 3 Centralized
controls are appropriate to this way of thinking because the market has
failed. The public trust doctrine persists on this basis. "The adoption of the
public trust doctrine was predicated on the belief that private ownership of
certain resources of a peculiarly public nature, valued for their importance
to society, would be inappropriate." 3
Pigovian economic models are the basis for this socialistic35 govern-
29. PROPERTY, NATIONAL GAZETTE, supra note 26, at 266-67.
30. DOUGLAS C. NORTH & ROGER LERoY MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC ISSUES 164
(5th ed. 1980) (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)).
31. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
32. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in THE PORTABLE
JEFFERSON, at 396-97 (M. Peterson ed., 1975).
33. Conversely, "By leading men to sacrifice their dignity for security, freedom for equality, and
justice for hypothetical social justice, they are led to ask for more state power. And when men are led to
expect everything from the state, they forget how to rely on themselves." Louis Pauwels, Property
Rights and Freedom, in PRIVATE RIGHTS & PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 22, at 1, 3.
34. Mark Cheung, Dockominiums: An Expansion of Riparian Rights That Violates The
Public Trust Doctrine, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 821, 830 (1989).
35. Pauwels identified this socialism as "scientific."
It calls for the collective appropriation of the means of production and, in the name of class
struggle, it claims that state property is the only form of property that leads to absolute
justice. However, when we see the direction that our societies are taking and see that
freedom is diminishing, we discover that government property is the legal form of robbing
[Vol. 15
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mental intervention.36 Pigovian models rationalize communal ideals be-
cause the costs of externalities are perceived to be evidence of market
failure.3" Economics,38 the dominant college economics text of the 1960s
and 1970s, strongly influenced such thinking. That text states:
Wherever there are externalities, a strong case can be made for
supplanting complete individualism by some kind of group action
... The reader can think of countless.... externalities where
economics would suggest some limitations on individual freedom
in the interest of all.39
As students of that generation gained political clout, the interventionist
bias manifested and centralized regulatory approaches were readily
adopted.
New economic models incorporate the elemental values of property
rights and transactional costs. 40 While Pigovian economic theory rational-
izes the avoidance of compensation for environmental actions as benefiting
the public, 41 newer economic models indicate that such environmental
meddling is inappropriate.4 2 Communal command-and-control responses
are now shown to have much larger costs than previously thought.
"[W]hen property rights can be transferred coercively by imposing taxes
or regulations, rent-seeking competition becomes far more destructive
individuals. If the primary value of a democracy is the respect or individual freedom, we
must recognize that the foundation of individual freedom rests in the right to private
property. In fact, individual freedom and private property are inseparable. Actually, the
right to property is freedom.
Pauwels, supra note 33, at 2-3.
36. See BURTON, EpilogueTHE MYTH OFSOCIAL CosTS 87 (Cheung ed., 1978) ("The Pigovian
analysis contains an implicit bias toward 'interventionist solutions' for externalities in the form of taxes,
subsidies, regulations and prohibitions [because] externalities necessitate 'corrective' government
action.").
37. Terry L. Anderson, The Market Process and Environmental Amenlties, in Eco.os.ucs AND
THE ENVIRONMENT. A RECONCILIATION, supra note 19, at 137-38.
38. PAUL A. SAMtUELSON, ECONOMICS (Ilth ed. 1980).
39. Id. at 450; see also Terry Anderson & Donas Leal, Free Market Versus Political
Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. 7 PUB. PL'Y, 299-300.
40. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcON. 1 (1960). This brand of
institutional economics is generating a body of literature that is changing the way we think about
government and its role in the market system. See Anderson, supra note 37; but see Pierre Schiag. An
Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: a View from the Left, 1986 Wsc. L.
Rev. 919.
41. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York. 438 US. 104, 133-34 n.30 (1978)
(justifying several earlier holdings "on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to the
implementation of a policy-not unlike historic preservation--expected to produce a widespread
public benefit.... ); see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YAt.E L.J. 36 (1964).
42. This framework for thinking about the environment has been identified as "New Resource
Economics" and was first formally discussed in Terry L. Anderson. New Resource Economics: Old
Ideas and New Applications, 64 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 928, 928-34 (1982). But see Joseph Sax. The
Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473 (1989).
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than market-bidding competition. ' 5 It is now believed that communal
needs will be best served when "everybody's business is nobody's
business.
Constitutional limits necessarily constrain the government's power to
redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property. If uses
of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification
under state police power, "the natural tendency of human nature [would
be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappear[ed] .- ,
Expectations are the foundation of our market based society. How-
ever, expectations are inherently defeated if we permit the arbitrary
shifting of private rights to communal ones. Conversely, if the government
were denied the power of eminent domain and the ability to compel some
arbitrary shifting of property ownership, the community could suffer at the
equally arbitrary whims of private owners and cartels.46 To resolve this
dilemma, the Fifth Amendment states, in part, "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. '' 47 Conse-
quently, it is inappropriate for government to continue to allow resource
decisions to be made in a fashion devoid of fiscal consideration. When
expectations are taken or defeated, compensation is owed.
A theoretical formula for determining when compensation is owed
under the Fifth Amendment has not been established,48 especially when
only a portion of the economic benefit of property is taken.4 9 "Although no
precise rule determines when property has been taken, the question
necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests." 50 In 1922,
43. John Baden & Richard L. Stroup, Natural Resource Scarcity. Entrepreneurship, and the
Political Economy of Hope, in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION, supra note
19, at 117, 118.
44. Walter E. Block, Environmental Problems. Private Property Rights Solutions, in ECONOM-
ICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION, supra note 19, at 281. Adam Smith said much the
same thing when he explained, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 183 (1976).
45. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
46. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV.
239, 259 (1992).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. This is qualified by two exceptions that categorically established that compensation is owed:
(1) Physical invasion, see. e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); and (2) the denial of all economic benefit, see Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); see also Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981).
49. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
50. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
(Vol. 15
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Justice Holmes wrote: "The general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.)
51
The determination of a taking is a question of degree. 2 Today,
wetlands regulation under section 404 of the Clean Water Act5 3 dominates
the regulatory takings calendar.54 Because the wetlands issue is at the
forefront of the current environmental agenda, the public trust doctrine
has become a source of conflict. 5
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
While the concept of the public trust existed as early as the Roman
Empire,56 the American version of the doctrine 57 evolved from English
history. 58 The Roman property system held that coastal shores "cannot be
51. Pennsylvania v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1992).
52. Id. at 416.
53. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
54. See most recently Bowles v. United States, No. 303-88L, 1994 WL 102117 (Fed. Cl. March
24, 1994); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 CI. Ct. 310 (1991); Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156
(1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 153 (1990); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), vacated, 62 U.S.L.W. 2588 (Fed. Cir. March 10, 1994);
Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785 (1989); Beure-Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 42 (1988);
Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210
(Ct. Cl. 1981); and Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. La.
1981), for cases concerning the issue whether the denial of wetland fill or dredging permits constitutes a
taking pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
55. For an example of the tenuous balance between property rights and the public trust, consider
Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976). where the Florida Supreme Court held that the
Marketable Record Title Act barred the State from claiming public trust ownership of the bed of non-
meandered lakes or ponds previously conveyed in U.S. patents and deeds. Only ten years later, however.
that same court reasoned that the public trust in sovereign lands was more valuable than private title
rights protected under the Marketable Record Title Act. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied. 107 U.S. 950 (1987).
56. The public trust doctrine is complicated and arcane; its roots go back for millennia.This does
not explain why the public trust doctrine is one of the most controversial developments in modern
American law, and perhaps the single most controversial development in natural resources law.
Wilkinson, supra note 15, at 425-26.
57. Michigan and South Carolina are exceptions to this doctrine. Michigan held title to the
Great Lakes and Lake St. Clair, but granted title to the beds of all other waterways in the state to the
riparian owners. Michigan v. Venice of Am. Land Co., 125 N.W. 770 (Mich. 19 10); Lorman v. Benson,
8 Mich. 18 (1860). South Carolina follows the common law which conveys title to the bed of navigable
water bodies to the riparian owners and not the state. State ex tI. McLeod v. Sloan Constr. Co.. 328
S.E.2d 84 (S.C. 1985).
58. The California Supreme Court found that the public trust doctrine existed in Mexican law at
the time California was ceded to the United States, and thus held that even private grants pursuant to
that law prior to statehood were subject to the public trust.
Law III of Title XXVIII of Las Siete Partidas, the law in effect while California was a part
of Mexico, provided, "The things which belong in common to the creatures of this world are
the following, namely, the... sea and its shores, for every living creature can use each of
these things according as it has need of them. For this reason every man can use the sea and
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said to belong to anyone as private property." 59 However, following the
demise of the Roman Empire and its formal property system, the public
trust doctrine disappeared until it was resurrected in English feudal law."0
Sir Matthew Hale, counsel for King Henry VIII after the Crown
abandoned the Roman Catholic State, resurrected the ownership of the
beds of navigable water bodies as a fictitious presumption.6' This presump-
tion allowed lands not conveyed to private parties to belong to the Crown.
The King thus claimed absolute power over the coastal shores and the right
to alienate portions of the coast to the exclusive domain of private
subjects. a2
The Magna Carta, however, restrained King John's power. No longer
did his powers include the right to exclude the citizenry from sailing and
fishing in coastal waters. Nor did the King retain the power to freely
alienate a clear and absolute title to these waters.0 3 The Magna Carta
bifurcated the English public trust; the King owned the jus privatum title
and Parliament owned the jus publicum title. 4 At least one court has
recognized the significance of this bifurcation: "Since neither party held all
the rights to the shoreland, neither could convey it with free and clear title
into private hands."65 Parliament and the King were in essence tenants-in-
common of these trust resources, each possessing a less than exclusive
ownership which could still be transferred.
At the time of the Magna Carta, unrestricted public access was not
problematic. Neither population pressures nor the technological level of
those sharing the fishery were sufficient to jeopardize the water resources.
It was more efficient to permit access pursuant to the public trust than to
manage the public's access.
The public trust doctrine first appeared in North America in the 1641
Body of Libertyes.16 American colonists, governing themselves with their
its shore for fishing or for navigation, and for doing everything there which he thinks may be
to his advantage." Law V1 provided, "Rivers, harbors, and public highways belong to all
persons in common .... " (Las Siete Partidas, CCH (Spain) (1931) pp. 820-821). The
Mexican law originated in 13th century Spain under Alfonso the Wise [citation omitted].
City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792, 797 n.8 (Cal. 1982).
59. J. INST. 2.1.1-2.1.6, (Thomas C. Sandars trans., 1st Am. ed. 1876).
60. One commentator identifies the English doctrine as "the public trust doctrine that was...
[an] obscure, unfixed, unclear doctrine of communal rights ... if normatively sensible at all in its own
time and place, of little or no application to our republican form of government." Cohen, supra note 46,
at 241.
61. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, §§ 3.09[3][c], 3.36.5(1993).
62. Everett Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L.
REV. 313, 315-322 (1918).
63. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Mass. 1979).
64. Fraser, supra note 62, at 315-322.
65. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 359.
66. Id.
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birthright English common law, allowed for unlimited access to fishing and
sailing in coastal waters. The colonists adopted an interpretation of the
doctrine that rejected valid property rights that the English doctrine had
established. The use of the American public trust doctrine to preclude
private title transfer first arose in the nineteenth century as an attempt to
place natural law restraints on untrustworthy legislatures.17 Legislative
mistrust and the consequent confusion of Lord Hale's"I j us publicum and
jus privatum led to the state retaining title to lands under water in order to
preserve the public rights of fishing and navigation.69 Because the
American public trust doctrine is almost entirely judge-made, early
environmental lawyers seized upon the trust to justify judicial review of
resource decisions.7" Several commentators have suggested that courts
adopted the lofty rhetoric of common ownership too literally and failed to
understand that substantial private rights were permitted in the supposed
common resource.
7 1
The adoption of the American doctrine disrupted the precarious
balance the English had established between the King and the Parliament.
While the English titles ofjus publicum and jus privatum were bifurcated
and vested in the separate entities of the Parliament and the King, the
American colonists vested the titles in a single governmental entity, the
state. Consequently, the balance established under the English system was
defeated.
Contemporary courts exacerbate this dilemma by holding that the
states hold not a single merged title, but two titles; the state can sell neither
title so long as each remains subject to the other. The Oregon Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay72 used this analysis to establish a
public right to use the dry sand upland at Cannon Beach." After Lucas, the
67. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). for an example ofjudicial rejection of
an "inappropriate" legislative act accomplished by an early application of the American public trust
doctrine.
68. See MATTHEW HALE, DE JURE MARiS, reprinted in STUART MOORE. A HISTORY Or THiE
FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370, 374 (3d ed. 1888).
69. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum. and the Public Trust. An Historical Analysis. I SEA
GRANT L.J. 13, 56 (1976).
70. See generally Sax, supra note 3, at 471.
71. See, e.g., Deveney, supra note 69; Glen J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil
and Common Law: Historical Development. Current Importance. and Some Doctrines That Don't
Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 511 (1975).
72. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
73. Id. at 672. This was held not to constitute a taking because:
While the foreshore is "owned" by the state, and the upland is "owned" by the patentee or
record-title holder, neither can be said to "own" the full bundle of rights normally connoted
by the term "estate in feesimple".... The rule in this case, based upon custom, is salutary in
confirming a public right, and at the same time it takes from no man anything which he has
had a legitimate reason to regard as exclusively his.
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Oregon courts placed further credence in this limitation. The United
States Supreme Court delivered the Lucas decision while Stevens v.
Cannon Beach, 4 another takings decision, was pending before the Oregon
Supreme Court. The Oregon court promptly identified the state law
limitation established in Lucas, and held:
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, is an expression of state law that
the purportedly taken property interest was not part of plaintiff's
estate to begin with. Accordingly, there was no taking within the
meaning of the Oregon or United States Constitutions.""
This interpretation of the public trust doctrine is not consistent with
the doctrine's English evolution. The King always had the capacity to sell
thejus privatum title, just as Parliament could market thejus publicum for
whatever value could be captured. 76 The English bifurcation served to
hinder the sale of either title by reducing its value, but it never prohibited
such transfer. As one commentator concluded:
Certainly the evidence establishes a long tradition of treating
navigable waters as commons, but the specific limitations on the
transfer and use of submerged lands imposed by the courts
represent judicial intervention that cannot be fully justified by
history.77
A renewed interest in the public trust doctrine should abide by historical
accuracy and restore the jus publicum/jus privatum bifurcation. 8
THE MODERN PUBLIC TRUST EXPANSION
Today, the public's demands for resource access are far greater than
at any other time in history. These demands are no longer consistent with
the public access afforded by archaic interpretations of the public trust
doctrine. Continued unlimited access is leading to the destruction of an
otherwise valuable resource. Despite the inevitability of this course, courts
Id.
74. 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994).
75. Stevens, 835 P.2d at 942.
76. See Fraser, supra note 62, at 318.
77. Deveney, supra note 69, at 13.
78. Even those states that rejected the "English rule" and
adopted the navigable in fact test to determine title, did so under the mis-apprehension that
Hale's presumption was a rule of law and that to adopt his system (of jus publicum/jus
privatum) would be to abdicate title, and hence the public right of navigation, in the great
non-tidal rivers of America. The jus publicum, the public right, was thus transformed from
an open-ended set of uses over navigable waters protected by the police power of the state
into a species of quasi-property which the state must maintain to preserve navigation.
Id. at 54.
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continue to expand the public trust doctrine.7 Ironically, therefore, public
resource detriment occurs at the expense of private rights.80
The modern story of the public trust's8 judicial activism is one of vast
expansion on two fronts. Such expansion reveals that the doctrine can be
responsive to new resource demands and political pressures, but that courts
are proceeding down an unwise course. The first expansive front pertains to
those interests protected under the public trust. The second pertains to
those "waters" where the public trust doctrine is deemed applicable.
JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF PUBLIC TRUST INTERESTS
The cornerstone application of the modern public trust doctrine was
established in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.82 In that case, the
United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine created "a title held in
trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. ' 3 This triad
of traditional interests, fishing, boating, and commerce, has since been
judicially expanded. No longer are the public trust interests limited to the
ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but now they extend as well
to recreational swimming, bathing, and other beachfront activities.88 As
one author concluded, "for some jurisdictions, public trust rights appar-
ently are open-ended."88
A novel expansion of the traditional public trust interests occurred in
1983 when the California Supreme Court added ecological values to the
79. See Ted J. Hannig, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integratlon" A
Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983); Janice Laurence Note. Lyon and
Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of Public Trust. 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1138 (1982).
80. See, e.g., Statev. Sorenson, 436 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Iowa 1989) (rejecting an argument that
accreted lands adjacent to the Missouri River were not subject to the public trust because they were not
necessary for navigation or commerce). After the court took judicial notice "of the expanding
involvement of Iowans in recreational activities on and near navigable streams such as the Missouri
River," the court held, "The land in question here is undoubtedly suited for use as public access to the
river. . .' and thus, was held subject to the public trust. Id.
See also Note, Constitutional Right to Fish: A New Theory ofAccess to the Waterfront. 16 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 661 (1983); Allan Robert Berrey, Note, Public Access to Lands Annually Flooded: A
Constitutional Analysis of Section 2016 of the California Fish and Game Code, 16 PAC. LJ. 353
(1984).
81. Cohen, supra note 46, at 241 (describing this modern American doctrine as the doctrine
"that is ... a jumbled and evolving body of case law and commentary... bear[ing] only a tangential
relation to its antecedents ... far less clear as to content, radically changed in focus, and enormously
enlarged in scope").
82. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
83. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452.
84. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon by the Sea, 294 A.2d 47. 54 (NJ. 1972).
85. Id.
86. JOSEPH J. KALO, COASTAL AND OCEAN LAw 119 (1990).
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protected trust interests. In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
of Alpine County,8 the court held that "the scenic views of [Mono Lake]
and its shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and
feeding by birds" must be considered before any appropriative water
grants could be upheld.8 The court further held that the state had an
affirmative duty "to protect the people's common heritage of streams,
lakes, marshlands and tidelands.. .. "89 When the Water Board deeded the
subject water grants from Mono Lake tributaries to Los Angeles in 1940,
those interests were not within the rubric of the public trust. Nevertheless,
the court expanded the trust to encompass them. Because the Water Board
had not protected these interests decades earlier, the court rescinded the
water grants.8 0 The court considered public trust interests more significant
than private property rights conveyed to Los Angeles by the grant deeds.
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that health, recrea-
tion, and sports were intimately related to the general welfare of a well-
balanced state.91 Despite private titles, the Court expanded the public trust
doctrine because it protected those interests. 2
JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF PUBLIC TRUST WATERS
While the interests protected by the trust have judicially expanded,
courts have also expanded the types of waters to which the trust applies.98
Until 1851, American courts refused federal admiralty jurisdiction except
on waters where the tide ebbed and flowed."" Then in 1851, the federal
court granted admiralty jurisdiction to the non-tidal, but navigable, Great
87. 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).
88. National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719.
89. Id. at 720.
90. But see Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 166 P. 309, 310-11 (Utah 1917),
for an early opinion that did not involve navigable waters or the public trust doctrine, but that rejected
the public environmental benefits of instream water reservations by comparing them to valid private
water rights:
[It is] utterly inconceivable that a valid appropriation of water can be made under the laws
of this state, when the beneficial use of which, after the appropriation is made, will belong
equally to every human being who seeks to enjoy it .... [W]e are decidedly of the opinion
that the beneficial use contemplated in making the appropriation must be one that inures to
the exclusive benefit of the appropriator and subject to his domain and control.
91. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984).
92. Id.
93. See Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, I J. ENVTL. LAW &
LITIG. 107, 107 (1986). While the application of the public trust has been extended and the doctrine
has "evolved into an amphibian, moving easily from the waters onto shorelands," dry sand beaches, and
inland lakes and streams, it is not likely that the same doctrine can "shed its fins, scales and the webbed
feet to climb upland to the forests and mountains." Id.
94. Richard W. Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-Struggle for a
Doctrine, 48 OR. L. REv. 1, 8 n.34 (1968).
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Lakes.95
The jurisdiction is here [in the Judiciary Act of 1789] made to
depend upon the navigable character of the water, and not upon
the ebb and flow of the tide. If the water was navigable it was
deemed to be public; and if public, was regarded as within the
legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the
Constitution.96
As this jurisdiction expanded, so too did the applicability of the public
trust.
In 1981, the California Supreme Court established that the public
trust turned upon navigability rather than on tidal influence.97 Later, in
National Audubon Society, the California Supreme Court adopted a
harmful nexus standard to bring the non-navigable tributaries of navigable
waters under the umbrella of public trust protection. 8 The harms that the
National Audubon Society sought to enjoin occurred in the navigable lake
body; however, the city was taking water from non-navigable tributaries.
Various state courts have expanded the interpretation of public trust
waters. 99 In New Jersey, for example, the trust applies to the beaches and
dry uplands abutting public trust waters. 100 New Jersey cases have allowed
the public to utilize municipally owned lands. In Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, the court was willing to go much further in recogniz-
ing the increased recreational demands of today's society:
Today, recognizing the increasing demands for our State's
beaches and the dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine, we
find that the public must be given both access to and use of
privately-owned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary.'01
The court refrained from determining what was "reasonable."'' 02 Al-
though it did not use the term taking, the court expressed no qualms about
taking private property under the guise of the public trust., Similarly, the
95. Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451-58 (1851).
96. Id. at 457.
97. State v. Superior Court of Lake County (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239 (Cal. 198 1). cert. denied, 454
U.S. 865 (1981); State v. Superior Court of Placer County (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981). Whether this expansion constitutes a taking for which compensation is
owed remains undecided. See supra note 17.
98. National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 720-21.
99. See Reed, supra note 93, at 107.
100. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364-66.
101. Id. at 365.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 365-366; but see Bottv. Natural Resources Comm'n, 327 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. 1982).
The court expressed concern for property owners who had purchased properties hoping that the private
character of the adjacent waters would significantly add to their value. This case drew a distinction
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Oregon Supreme Court allowed the public to retain title to the sandy
upland at Cannon Beach. 04
Perhaps the most creative expansion of public trust application
occurred in 1988. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,0' the Court
concluded that the public trust doctrine was dispositive. Although the state
recognized the validity of the private title, the United States Supreme
Court held that the public trust precluded any alleged title grants, and
awarded the parcels in question to Mississippi.108 Dissenting Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia, noted, "Although
Mississippi collected taxes on the land and made no mention of its claim for
over 150 years, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Mississippi was
not estopped from dispossessing petitioners."'0 7 The Court extended the
doctrine to apply it to the parcels at issue. Therefore, the Court reexamined
the historic tidal character test. The Court explained that although the
parcels are "several miles north of the Mississippi Gulf Coast and are not
navigable, they are nonetheless influenced by the tide, because they are
adjacent and tributary to [a stretch of] the Jourdan River, [which is also
affected by the tide and is] a navigable stream flowing into the Gulf."' 0 8
The Court redefined the traditional factor of tidal influence to include
adjacency through a tributary nexus.
NON-COMPENSATED TAKINGS
Though judicial expansions clearly infringe upon long recognized
property rights, courts have utilized an abundance of legal devices to
circumvent the Fifth Amendment requirement of compensation for
takings. In two 1984 cases, the Montana Supreme Court determined what
uses to permit in public trust waters, but refrained from determining the
proper titles of the beds.109 Therefore, the court reasoned that a takings
claim could not be properly raised." 0 Other courts have avoided the
takings issue by invoking dedication"' and custom. " 2
between traditional public trust rights and newly asserted recreational rights that would unacceptably
extend the trust at the expense of private owners' expectations. Id.
104. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969). See also supra note 2 for the
more recent ramifications of this decision.
105. 484 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1988).
106. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 484-85.
107. Id. at 494.
108. Id. at 472.
109. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984);
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Mont. 1984).
110. Curran, 682 P.2d at 171; Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1093. But see, Galt v. Montana Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987) (holding that the statutory grant of certain uses
on private land incident to public trust waters was not constitutional).
11. County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 605 P.2d 381 (Cal. 1980); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465
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In Phillips Petroleum, after extending the public trust doctrine's
scope to encompass the parcels in question, the Court held that the trust
itself precluded any valid private title deeds.11 3 The Court reasoned that
the state lacked the authority to transfer private title while maintaining a
trust over thejus publicum sovereignty power, and therefore, the title could
not be properly transferred to any private party.114 Thus, the deed was
invalidated. Without a valid deed, the Court concluded there could be no
takings claim.115 The implication of this analysis provides in the wake of
Lucas a vast power for states to take private property without
compensation.
What remains is a paradox: the jus publicum title exists, preventing
the state from transferring its jus privatum title, yet no one explicitly owns
this title. The jus publicum should be abdicated in favor of a market
system, thereby freeing the state to transfer thejus privatum title as it sees
fit, and ultimately privatizing the public trust.
PUBLIC AccEss, AT WHAT COST?
When courts expand the public trust doctrine for perceived public
benefit, they harm the water resource in several fashions. By unsettling
owner's expectations, water resources are no longer viewed as covetable
assets. By affecting the alienability of public trust parcels, owners are
discouraged from fostering management practices which otherwise would
be rewarded. Because it is difficult to appraise and then market shifting
property interests, the uncertainty caused by the public trust hinders
alienability. Because such property is thus without any value, an owner is
discouraged from investing money to foster the resource. Nevertheless, the
public trust persists to affect even lawful and statutory deeds.
Riparian deeds often represent title claims to the low water mark.
Montana has codified this general deed provision."1 6 Nevertheless, many
state courts construe this provision subject to public trust interests. In
Montana, such deeds are subject to the angling statute, which recognizes a
public right to fishing access up to the high water mark of navigable
streams.11
7
P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970).
112. State ex rel. Thornton Voltey, 462 P.2d 676-77 (Or. 1969).
113. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 485 (1988).
114. Id.
115. Id. This analysis closely mirrors that used by the California Court in National Audubon
Soc'y. See supra notes 88 and 98 and accompanying text.
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (1993).
117. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 172 (Mont. 1984); but see.
Gait v. Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks. 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987). See MosrT.
CODE ANN. § 87-2-305 (1993).
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Constitutionally protected private property rights should prevail over
statutory interests.118 The uncertainties of riparian deeds and clouded legal
rights hinder alienability. Such uncertainties regarding title hinder the
"buyer's willingness to invest in shorefront properties. As identified by
dissenting Justice Braucher after a Massachusetts Court invalidated
private title to wharf space on Boston Harbor:
The present decision leaves in limbo the ownership of the
particular tract in litigation. The resulting uncertainty as to that
tract may not be a matter of grave public concern, but we are told
that there will be a similar mischievous effect on uncounted other
parcels. In time, the uncertainty may be alleviated by a broad
interpretation of what uses are consistent with the "public
purpose" embodied in the condition .... Meanwhile, however,
the present decision creates a clog on the alienability of land
contrary to a public policy that has prevailed for centuries. 119
Obstruction to alienability leaves little incentive for private landown-
ers to maximize the value of the resource in question. The instability of a
return on a resource investment leads to a reluctance to invest and
ultimately hinders the resource wealth of the property. If the buyer is
fearful of even retaining his investment value, the reluctance is even
greater.
While the United States Supreme Court has traditionally recognized
the importance of honoring reasonable investment-backed expectations
and investments in property interests, "such expectations can only be of
consequence where they are 'reasonable' ones." 2' In Phillips Petroleum,
though acknowledged to be a case of first impression, the Court held that
118. While some commentators, notably Mr. Sax, argue that the public trust doctrine is itself
constitutionally based, there is little evidence to support this. Of the triad of traditional interests, the
commerce interest is vested within the Commerce Clause; navigation is sheltered by admiralty
jurisdiction, navigation servitudes, and the Commerce Clause. There is no federal provision affording a
right to fish, though some state constitutions do recognize this interest (e.g., Vermont Constitution,
Chapter II, § 67 "The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonal times ... to fish in all
boatable and other waters (not private property)." Were the trust doctrine constitutional, there would
be no need for duplicity of interest protections. As for basing the public trust doctrine within state
constitutions, it would be inconsistent with the federal constitution, and thus improper, to alter vested
property rights. Also, while every state constitution contains a compensation provision of some form,
and most mirror the Fifth Amendment, "[tihe constitutions of twenty-three states are broader ... in
that they require compensation when private property is either taken or damaged for public use." John
N. Fulham & Stephen Scharf, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging of a Zoning
Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1440 n.3 (1974). See also Michael C. Blumm, Property Myths,
Judicial Activism, and the Lucas Case, 23 ENVTL. L. 907 (1993) (distinguishing property rights and
development rights).
119. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 370 (Mass. 1979)
(Braucher, J., dissenting).
120. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 482 (1988).
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the owners' investment-backed expectations were unreasonable and there-
fore uncompensable. The Court then held that earlier state court holdings
were ample precursors of faulty title because of the established public
trust. 21 In the dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and
Scalia, stated that the case involved more than "cold legal doctrine" and
expressed the sentiment that the majority decision would disrupt the
settled expectations of landowners nationwide.
122
If public trust properties are subjected to doubt and clouded titles, any
investment in them is legally unreasonable. Consequently, the incentive to
invest in riparian resources is removed. Ironically, judicial interpretation
sends the message that properties subject to the public trust are not
covetable assets to be managed efficiently, but instead are liabilities.
While clearly recognizable and enforceable property rights would
provide security and incentives for the owner to invest in and foster the
water resources, uncertainty and public access transform the asset into a
liability and destroy this incentive. Any public trust analysis providing for
unlimited public access consequently results in the owner's perception of
the resource as a liability.
123
If recognized property rights are held subject to a predating public
easement, the owner is denied perhaps the most important property right,
exclusivity. Without this right, the public is allowed access with little, or
more likely, no control. Such access, through the tragedy of the commons,
will ultimately harm the very resource which the trust is to serve. Even if
the public's consumptive usage never causes resource depletion, the mere
existence of this public right is a private liability for the owner.
Perhaps the greatest drawback to this type of analysis is that any
supposed easement is not sufficiently defined. If an easement is defined for a
limited number of identifiable persons so that transaction costs are low, the
Coase Theorem 24 tells us that efficient resource allocation will ensue
regardless of which party, recreationist or landowner, owns the easement.
With the easement assigned to the general public, however, the transaction
costs are significantly higher so that efficient resource allocations become
problematic.
Property is particularly attractive for application of the Coase
Theorem because the bundle of rights can be individually partitioned
without being diluted. One person may have the right to exclude, while
another may retain a right of entry. Such flexibility suits both parties and
121. Id. at 482.
122. Id. at 492-93.
123. See James Huffman, A Fish Out Of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989).
124. See Coase, supra note 40.
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allows both to determine the appropriate values for each property right. An
easement between neighbors is a classic, easily understood example of two
owners holding separate sticks from the same property bundle. If an
easement is granted to the general public, however, the example is no
longer so simple. Because the user group is no longer readily identified, the
owner's transaction costs are uncertain.
Further, if the public demand is sufficiently large to require an
easement, then the most efficient fashion of identifying a transaction cost is
to require the state to purchase the parcel from a public market pursuant to
eminent domain. The government may take property to satisfy public
wants, provided just compensation is paid. Consistent with the Coase
Theorem, the Fifth Amendment requires that just transaction costs be
ascertained and efficiently distributed among those whose demand has
been satisfied, in this case, the public.
While equating the public trust with an easement recognizes the
validity of private rights, it is not conducive to efficient resource manage-
ment. Though the bifurcated jus publicum/jus privatum system created an
acceptable commons system given the limited resource pressures of feudal
times, society's resource demands have changed. A commons is no longer
efficient, and an easement is not appropriate. As courts have recognized the
growth of recreational needs and responded with public trust expansion,
now is the time to respond to new social and environmental pressures and
curtail the trust's usage.125
Public access alone is sufficient to harm the public trust resource.
Pennsylvania's Bushkill Creek flows through a single privately owned
parcel in Northampton County. This creek's history offers a unique
understanding of the relationship between the control of public access and
resource wealth. In 1977, the creek's owner, wanting to allow continued
access but only in a regulated fashion, removed the creek from the state's
general fishery regulations and placed it instead within the Wild Trout
Program. Significantly, the creel limit was established to be one fish over
twenty inches. Under these regulations, by 1981 the trout population had
jumped from twenty-two to seventy-seven pounds per acre, even though
stocking was discontinued. The "[f]ishing was excellent."' 28
The fishing became so good in fact, that a few "anglers" opposed to
125. "Far from being a modern invention of goal-oriented judges, change is the unchanging
chronicle of water jurisprudence .... New needs have always generated new doctrines and, thereby,
new property rights." Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 268-69 (1990). "The problem is really quite simple; it does not require
mastery of abstruse legal doctrines to appreciate what is going on. The heart of the matter is that public
values have changed, and the use of water has reached some critical limits." Sax, supra note 4 1, at 474.
126. Joe Reynolds, Catch and Release: A No Lose Proposition, FIELD AND STREAM, July 199 1,
at 53.
[Vol. 15
PRIVATIZATION & PUBLIC TRUST
catch and release and strictly regulated access pressured the landowner to
again open the creek to general fishing. Their pressure culminated in
threatened arson against the owner's house. In response to these threats,
and because the state already had tremendous amounts of strictly
controlled water,127 the creek reverted to general regulations in 1982. "Our
1983 survey was astonishing-in a single year nearly two-thirds of the
trout population had been eliminated. All of the age four and five browns
[trout] had been killed; fish in the 18 to 28 inch class. I didn't think it would
have been possible in one year."
1 28
Even if public access does not deplete the resource to the extent it did
on Bushkill Creek, public access is a liability which reduces the owner's
incentive for good resource stewardship. If the public is allowed unlimited
access, the owner is exposed to the costs associated with open gates, rutted
roads, pollution, noise, and even civil liability.
Such costs are not merely hypothetical, but have been identified and
recognized. The Washington Supreme Court found that following the
installation of a public access ramp on a lake previously closed to the
public, the riparian owners were subjected to the following harms:
1. The fair market value of plaintiffs property has been
decreased.
2. Thievery on the lake has greatly increased, particularly the
stealing of boats, oars, outdoor furniture, tools and miscellaneous
items of personal property of all kinds. In many of the cases it was
definitely ascertained that the thieves gained access to the lake
from the public access area.
3. Persons relieving themselves in the lake as well as on the
property and front yards of various of the plaintiffs, to the
considerable embarrassment and annoyance of the plaintiffs,
their families and guests.
4. Beer cans, worm cans, sandwich bags, pop bottles, rafts, and
other assorted trash has been deposited in the lake and on the
plaintiff's beaches in considerable quantity.
5. Repeated and frequent trespasses on the plaintiffs' front
yards, docks, beaches and property. In addition to the trespasses
by persons coming in by the access area, numerous other
trespassers have crossed the plaintiffs yards, docks, beaches and
property from other adjoining residential areas, and which
trespassers, when confronted by the plaintiffs, havejustified their
actions by saying to the effect that, 'Well, now, it's a public lake
isn't it.'
127. Pennsylvania has more specially regulated waters, such as Spring Creek and Yellow
Breeches, than any state in the Northeast. Id.
128. Reynolds, supra note 126, at 53.
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6. Numerous of the plaintiffs, their children and grandchildren,
have severely and frequently been cut by broken beer bottles left
on the beaches.
7. Fishermen using plaintiffs' docks, and fishing immediately
adjacent to their beaches and front yards, would refuse to leave
when requested and would stare and make remarks when
plaintiffs, their wives and daughters would try to use their
beaches for sun bathing, swimming, or the entertainment of
guests. The plaintiffs, as a result of this, cut down very considera-
bly in their use of their front yards and beaches.
8. Although hunting and shooting on the lake are illegal, hunters
come in and shoot on the lake. Persons also come in and shoot at
ducks with air rifles.
9. Speed boating on the lake has greatly increased. In some cases
it has increased to the extent that it has become a danger to the
plaintiffs' children.
10. The public use of the lake has interfered with the plaintiffs'
use of the lake for boating, swimming, fishing, and recreational
purposes.
11. The noise on the lake has substantially increased. 129
While many of these harms are enjoinable nuisances or civil viola-
tions, the state's enforcement cost is too great to warrant effective
intervention. In fact, after the state of Washington was unable to reach an
agreement with the riparian owners, the state determined that it could not
afford the court required regulation of public access. 130 The state allowed
the lake to revert to private usage and closed public access.
A riparian owner whose property is subject to public use under the
public trust doctrine could not similarly deny public access. Nonetheless,
the private owner has the same strong incentives to avoid these costs and
harms. Ironically, since allowing the resource to be degraded will reduce
the public's demand, the owner who bears these harms has a perverse
incentive to allow and even encourage the resource's degradation. The
destruction of the resources for which public access has been sought is the
true irony of the current misguided public trust analysis. Put succinctly,
fishing access, if there are no fish, is valueless.
129. Botton v. State, 420 P.2d 352, 353-54 (Wash. 1966) (quoting the trial court's findings of
fact).
130. Additionally, the state feared that if such precedent were allowed to stand and a guard were
hired, then there would be an outcry from riparian owners of every other lake with a public access to be
patrolled, a cost the state could not bear. See JOSEPH L. SAX & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL
OF WATER RESOURCES 140 n.1 (1986).
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PRIVATIZATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
This article has stated the need to prevent courts from circumventing
the constitutional takings issue. Those who espouse the public trust
doctrine as a means of avoiding this communal obligation seek to take
valuable property resources for the public without the provision of
compensation. Such social free-riding occurs whenever persons benefit
from transactions to which they do not contribute costs. Each of us
inherently desires to obtain something for nothing.
However, our market system ensures that consumers make informed
choices which are inspired by economic incentives. While each of us would
like to compel ecological sanctity without cost, new economic models are
disclosing previously unseen costs. When the public is made aware of these
real costs, perhaps those advocating continued expansion of the public trust
shall be properly exposed as social free-riders. This article measures
change not solely by good intentions, but by the measurable and constitu-
tional costs of implementation.
The problem of these communal free-riders is easily rectified by
properly recognizing the jus privatum title. Vested in private fee, histori-
cally this title is enforceable and transferrable. Even in Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court recognized that at
least to a limited extent, this title remained transferable:
- It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters,
within the limits of the several States, belong to the respective
States within which they are found, with the consequent right to
use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the
waters .... "I
Thejus privatum title should require compensation when property is taken.
In this fashion, our communities can be assured that those environmental
goods that are in demand can be obtained, while increasing social wealth.
"[T]he will of the majority is, from a social wealth perspective, quite
different from the general interest." ' 2
By subjecting public trust resources to market pressures, we can
guarantee that our resources will most efficiently maximize social wealth.
Such market function is possible only with clearly defined property rights.
Even with such private property rights, continued public access is ensured.
This conclusion is supported by the new resource economics reshaping this
debate.
131. 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
132. Cohen, supra note 46, at 262.
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Only when rights are well defined, enforced and transferrable
will self-interested individuals confront the trade-offs inherent in
a world of scarcity. As entrepreneurs move to fill profit niches,
prices will reflect the values we place on resources and the
environment.
133
So long as the public's demand for resource access creates a niche, market
theory indicates it will be filled. Though some environmentalists balk at
capitalizing our environmental priorities, such shifting of incentives will
ultimately result in better resource management. While the private
ownership of resources is often mistakenly criticized for leading to "rape
and pillage" behavior, this attitude assumes that private owners desire to
exhaust a resource as quickly as possible. New analysis discloses that such
a belief is unfounded.
1 3 4
Only if the resource is more valuable today than it will be in the future
do rational notions of efficiency indicate that a hurried harvest is best.
Efficiency otherwise dictates that the resource be preserved. Those forces
opposing privatization reveal that the issue is one of identifying compara-
tive values.
If a resource is expected to become more valuable over time, perhaps
in response to resource scarcity, owners interested in increasing their
wealth will preserve the resource for the future, even if the resource owner
does not expect to live to see the resource finally utilized.135 If we are sincere
in the desire to serve the general interest, we should direct our efforts to
allowing resources to accurately reflect their highest value.
The greatest means of advancing social wealth is to require those who
"mismanage" these resources (from the public's perspective) to directly
bear the consequential costs, while rewarding those who satiate the public's
demands. The market, when it functions without obstruction, explicitly
functions to define values and favorably manage resources. In a fiscally
neutral environment, market forces require individuals to determine
whether the potential surplus value realized through the holding of assets is
outweighed by other considerations.
13 6
133. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 22 (1991).
134. For example, Terry Anderson and Donald Leal's discussion about whether the Great Lakes
old growth pine timberlands were wasted in terms of aesthetic or environmental values that are not
included in commodity considerations in the nineteenth century. They conclude, "When judged
against prudent investment criteria, nineteenth-century timber markets were efficient. Even if non-
market, non-commodity values are included in the calculations, it is not clear that markets incorrectly
accounted for these values." Id. at 47.
135. See Michael D. Copeland, The New Resource Economics, in THE YELLOWSTONE PRIMER
13, 23 (John A. Baden & Donald Leal eds., 1987).
136. See Berry Bracewell-Milnes, Land and Heritage: The Public Interest in Personal
Ownership, 93 HOBART PAPER 29 (1981).
[Vol. 15
PRIVATIZATION & PUBLIC TRUST
The most accuratejudge of value is the individual negotiating within a
market. So long as an item or objective is valuable to an individual, it has
value, even though others disparage that item or objective. While there is
no guarantee that the market will ultimately provide pristine environmen-
tal quality,137 it must be remembered that even the public trust doctrine's
expansive applications provide no environmental guarantees. The priva-
tized market will assure that our environmental quality reflects that which
the public both demands and is willing to afford.
It must be bittersweet for those advocates of the public trust to recall
that in National Audubon Society, the court stated that while environmen-
tal resources require protection today, tomorrow they may be subjected to
still a greater public good.' 38 There is no denying that environmental values
are a function of both wealth and time.139 Environmentalists who are
honest historians would be surprised to discover the current status of the
public trust doctrine.'40 For example, the United States Supreme Court
once held that the dredging and filling of waterbodies for urban expansion
constituted efficient resource utilization and was warranted under the
public trust. 4
By recognizing clearly defined property rights and fostering a market
system, our natural resources are best valued and can be efficiently
managed. While there is little precedent in America for such privatization
of natural resources, several examples indicate that this is more than idle
theory.
In the Yellowstone River Valley south of Livingston, Montana,
privately owned spring-fed creeks provide a world class angling experience
to the public. As these streams originate and end on private property,
owners can regulate access and charge fees. Often, these creeks require
reservations and may be booked weeks or even months ahead. High prices
create strong incentives for the owner to maintain a high quality fishing
environment by protecting the stream banks from overgrazing and limiting
137. In fact, the market will assure that some level of resource harm remains because the public
will always demand certain goods, the production or consumption of which requires that harms occur.
It is highly unlikely that anyone will be able to pay the costs of restoring a pristine environment, even if
such restoration were technologically possible.
138. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal.
1983).
139. See Cohen, supra note 46, at 254. "As the United States has grown both in population and
in economicsize, wealth, and productivity, two economic forces have combined to bring about a change
in our relative demand for 'environmental' goods." Id.
140. "Perhaps the most obvious cause of surprise is that in its pre-20th century form, the public
trust doctrine was not only not an environmentalist principle, but more nearly its opposite." Id.
141. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,381-82 (1891); Den v. Jersey Co.. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 426.
432 (1854).
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fishing pressures."'
Pardee Reservoir in northern California, like countless other reser-
voirs in the state, is operated by a municipal utility district for drinking
water storage. By charging a nominal daily fee in addition to a $2.50 daily
fishing fee, the district is able to provide affordable public recreational
access for fishing and boating which is of higher quality than the nearby
recreational access that is free. Because lakes which are freely available in
the same vicinity receive lesser management, the quality and quantity of
the catch is low. In contrast, at Pardee, ten-pound trout, trophies in any
class of waters, are not uncommon. Because the fishing fees collected are
then reinvested in the resource, the paying public benefits. Similar
opportunity exists even in the urban environment of San Francisco, where
modest fee access allows for the management of a trophy fishery in the
North Lake and a fishery managed to produce high numbers of fish exists in
the South Lake at Lake Merced. Few locales afford urban children the
opportunity to catch trophy trout on a year-round basis.
Were more waters privatized and made available for such regulated
activities, those opportunities would expand. As the opportunities began to
compete against one another, the costs would come down even further.
Conversely, if the public trust doctrine is interpreted to preclude the
private right of exclusion, no fees may be collected and the resources will
suffer from overuse and the lack of investment and management.
England and Scotland have long recognized the private ownership of
fishing rights in non-tidal waters. 4" There, owners of stretches or "beats"
of the rivers may set their own angling rules and charge access fees. Such
fees range broadly from £ 1 or less a day for bait fishing to £100 for a day of
guided fly fishing. 44 Because these rights are clearly established, in
response to increasing public fishing pressure, there has been a recent
proliferation of such privately managed fisheries. As one commentator has
noted, "There are few landowners . . . who can afford to ignore the
commercial aspect of the sporting rights which they own." ' 4 5 Conse-
quently, fishing is now widely available in England at prices which are
affordable to the public.
This fee potential provides land owners with incentive to maintain and
even better the resource. "Beat managers in England and Scotland
regularly cut weeds when appropriate, protect the banks from cattle, and
142. Anderson & Leal, supra note 133, at 109.
143. Id.
144. Jane S. Shaw & Richard L. Stroup, Gone Fishin':" Britain's Streams are Lovely. Clear and
Deep and Private, REASON, Aug.-Sept. 1988, at 34, 36.
145. DOUGLAS SUTHERLAND, THE LANDOWNERS 110 (1968).
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limit the number of anglers." 6 These managers also initiate suits to enjoin
pollution or to collect damages for environmental harms. The fees serve as
incentive to provide attractive recreational venues, while the competition
for fee-paying anglers requires owners to offer the services and quality
which the public wants at a price it is willing to pay.""' These incentives will
not function without enforceable property rights, most notably the power
of exclusion.
Given privatization, economic incentives exist even for commercial
resource harvesters unconcerned with the public's recreational access.
Because in Mississippi, an oyster is not property until harvested, oystermen
harvest their oysters from public beds early in the season when the stock is
most vulnerable. Conversely, in Louisiana, fishermen own property leases
which allow them the right of exclusion. Thus, even unharvested oysters
are perceived as property. Because the early season harvest severely
pressures the resource stock, Mississippi oystermen make less money than
Louisiana's oystermen who thrive on the private lease system." 8 Louisi-
ana's oystermen earn $3,207 a season whereas those in Mississippi only
earn $807 after placing a greater strain on the sustainability of the
resource. 4
9
Oystermen are also subject to the public trust. In fact, one of this
nation's first public trust cases regarded oystermen in New Jersey. 0 Mr.
Arnold, the plaintiff, owned property bordering a navigable river where he
and his predecessors sowed oyster beds within staked plots that did not
interfere with navigation. Mr. Arnold claimed lawful and exclusive title to
his beds under deeds dating to an original grant from Charles II to the
Duke of York. Consequently, when Mr. Mundy, the defendant, harvested
Mr. Arnold's oysters, Mr. Arnold sued him in trespass.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that while title to non-navigable
streambeds could be privately conveyed, title to navigable streambeds
could not.151 Because the streambed claimed by Mr. Arnold was sover-
eignly held in the public trust, the court held Mr. Arnold could retain no
greater property interest than any other person, including Mr Mundy.
Therefore, the claim for trespass could not lie.8 2
In 1913, the United States Supreme Court again considered the
public trust as it pertained to oyster beds. In Lewis Blue Point Oyster
146. Shaw & Stroup, supra note 144, at 35.
147. Id. at 36.
148. Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Prices and Property Rights In the Fisheries,
42 S. ECON. J. 253, 262 (1979).
149. Id.
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Cultivation Co. v. Briggs,5 ' the United States Supreme Court concluded
that no compensation was owed for the taking or incidental destruction of
private oyster beds in Great South Bay, New York. The Court denied
compensation even though the private title pre-dated statehood because
the federal navigational interest pursuant to the public trust was
superior.""
Nearly a century later, the public trust's application to private oyster
beds remains controversial. Says Robert Engle, Chairman of the Florida
Aquacultural Advisory Council, "There's a group within the Department
of Natural Resources (DNR) that has a problem with the use of
submerged state lands for the private culture of clams or oysters and they
have thrown up roadblocks." ' 55 In fighting these DNR roadblocks,
oysterman Grady Levins spent $80,000 in legal bills defending his property
rights to a fifty-five acre oyster bed lease. He claimed others have spent up
to a quarter-million dollars. 5 '
Levins is one of a half-dozen oystermen who years ago received
"perpetual" oyster leases to the bed and the bottom six inches of the water
column in Apalachicola Bay, Florida. Since an oysterman spends a great
deal of time and money developing a profitable oyster lease, long term
holdings are far more desirable than leases with a short expiration date.
Levin pays a yearly fee to the state and recently spent $25,000 planting
oyster shells on the bottom and "otherwise enhancing his lease.
'"1 57
Clearly, Levin invested in his resource for long term gains, yet the DNR
jeopardized his lease rights through its application of the public trust
doctrine.
While there can be little question that the public trust applies to the
oystering rights of a bay that is both navigable and tidal,"58 the government
is not concerned with the resource at all. Former Governor Martinez
directed the DNR in pursuing this action. As DNR's David Hile makes
clear, the issue was that non-leaseholding oystermen objected to the use of
dredges on the leased lands. "Those same oystermen feared that by using
dredges, the leaseholders would not hire the 10 to 15 fishermen they've
retained in the past to gather the crop. Instead, one man could do the
153. 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
154. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co., 229 U.S. at 87-88.
155. Biff Lampton, A Fishy Futurefor Florida Farming, FLORIDA SPORTSMAN, May 1991, at
63.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 64.
158. See Crary v. State Highway Comm'n, 68 So. 2d 468, 471 (1953) (holding that a statute
granting riparian owners bordering on tidal waters the sole right of planting and gathering oysters in
front of their lands for 500 yards to seaward granted rights which were protected from private
infringement, though still subject to the superior rights of both the public and the state).
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work."' "9 Florida has thus rejected both economic efficiencies and valuable
property rights through application of the public trust solely to advance
short term political ends.
The value of entrepreneurship afforded by private rights in Louisiana
and Florida is not possible for commonly held land. Elected officials
necessarily manage commonly held property, yet because of election
pressures, they face an infinite discount rate when they regard decisions
that reach beyond approximately four years. Therefore, "communal
property means that future generations must speak for themselves."' 0
Conversely, simple market systems with foundational property rights
allow those most optimistic about high future values to control resource
decisions. "The highest bid will prevail, and the highest bidders will be
those who believe the resource will be worth more in the future." 161
Therefore, the strongest preservation values will control resource decisions
in a market system. As French economist J.B. Say noted in 1800, an
entrepreneur shifts economic resources from an area of lower productivity
and yield to one with a higher productivity and greater yield. The legal,
political, and regulatory institutions should not obstruct this function.
Conversely, the characteristic cost of communal property is inefficient
over-utilization of the property.
CONCLUSION
History is the story of evolving resource demands."8 2 Over time,
resources are utilized to provide for social advancement. History shows us
that many of these resources have neared extinction. New economic
models, however, reveal that resource devastation results from a lack of
property rights rather than through the exploitation of established rights.
Fisheries, bison, and timber suffered without enforceable management
because any thought of preservation was a capturable windfall to one's
competitors. There was no power of exclusion. While it has been said that
we learn from our mistakes, history also repeats itself. Without the
management conferred by private ownership, public trust resources will
continue to suffer from the tragedy of the commons. The public trust
doctrine today is at a crossroads where the courts have several options. The
courts can continue along the road of expansion, allowing increasingly vast
159. Lampton, supra note 155, at 65.
160. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Ahl. EcoN. REV. 57.66 (1967).
161. John Baden, Privatizing Wilderness Lands: The Political Economy of Harmony and Good
Will, in PRIVATE RIGHTS & PUBUC LANDS, supra note 22, at 53, 61.
162. See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J. LAW & EcoN. 163 (1975) fora discussion of the historical dynamics functioning
between ownership rights and economic and social institutions on the American Great Plains.
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communal interests to be "protected" in ever wider waters. This approach
not only allows unmanaged public access, it casts a harmful shadow on the
sanctity of property rights.
Courts can also uphold the significance of private property rights, but
then subject them to public usury easements. While initially attractive,
easements conferred to the public carry infinitely high transaction costs.
To each owner, the easement still exists as a liability. Unable to recoup
profits from the resource, the owner instead is led to reduce his exposure to
the appurtenant costs of public utilization, perhaps by destroying the
resource.
Historically, public access was permitted because the population and
technologic pressures did not threaten the resource. Today, both our
population and our technologic capacity threaten to destroy the public
trust resources. The public trust doctrine cannot allow for unlimited access
and still result in efficient management.
The historic jus publicum/jus privatum distinction has been blurred
so that it is no longer practically useful. The efficient alternative is for
courts to work with the doctrine's historic interest. This is feasible in the
face of today's pressures only by rewarding those who are most efficient at
responding to the public's demands. To facilitate this management, it is
necessary to establish clearly defined and enforceable private property
rights and foster market efficiencies. By abdicating the jus publicum
powers for a market system and by enforcing and clearly defining the jus
privatum title, courts can assure a system which is responsive to changing
public demands. This abdication of the public trust, if made by the
legislature, is properly enforceable by the courts. 6 '
By establishing within jus privatum titles the traditional bundle of
property rights, the public will benefit from private environmental entre-
preneurs who will strive to respond to public desire and capture the values
established by the public's demand. In this capacity, a value is established
for each resource opportunity, and those who are most efficient in providing
utilization opportunities to the public will capture the most wealth. Those
who are inefficient will be replaced by new entrepreneurs who more
effectively provide the resource opportunities the public demands.
The public trust doctrine, far from being an institutional obstacle, can
be privatized to afford today's society with a tremendous opportunity for
efficient resource management. By following this path, courts can end the
tragedy of the commons caused by unlimited public access. Courts can
promote a more efficient, dynamic form of resource management. By
163. "It is... grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly adjudged cases as a valid exercise of
legislative power. ... Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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relying upon markets which are responsive to public pressures and
rejecting the judicial activism fostered by Pigovian theories of interven-
tion, courts can most efficiently assure both continued public access and
resource sustainability. In Lucas, the United States Supreme Court left
the door open for the public trust doctrine. The Constitution, economic
efficiencies and the health of our environment require that we slam it shut.

